Defence
Assertion and APA Response |
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SUPER
HORNET
In keeping with the 2000 Defence
White Paper [Click
for more ...], the ADF is committed to maintaining an edge in
regional
air combat capability. |
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Maintaining an edge in regional air combat capability requires the
maintenance and acquisition of combat aircraft, weapons and systems
which have a decisive edge over regional capabilities. Neither the
Super Hornet nor the Joint Strike Fighter provide an edge over late
production Sukhoi
Flanker variants, or late production S-300PMU/S-400
series Surface Air Missile systems, all of which are proliferating
rapidly in Asia.
As long as both the Government and Defence remain committed to the
Super
Hornet and Joint
Strike Fighter, they cannot be committed to maintaining an edge in regional
air combat capability. They are exposing us, Australia
and future generations of Australians to significant risk.
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The
Super Hornet is the best aircraft to meet Australia’s bridging air
combat requirements as we prepare for a JSF-based future, subject to
government decision. |
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As there is no need for premature
retirement of the F-111, there is no need for a “bridging air
combat requirement” and thus the Super Hornet. Considering the fighter
types currently in production, the F-22A
Raptor presents a far better choice in all key roles, compared to
the Super Hornet.
The claim of a “JSF-based future” presupposes that the next government
will agree to purchase the JSF despite its unsuitability for our
strategic needs.
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The
Super Hornet is a battle-proven, multi-role aircraft that is
clearly the only capable, available system which meets Defence’s
requirements in the next 8-10 years. |
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To date the Super Hornet has not been flown in combat against a modern
Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), or against modern “double digit”
Surface to Air Missile systems, or later generation Flanker
fighters.
It has been flown only in very low threat environments against
disorganised legacy technology Surface-to-Air threats, and used
to bomb
low threat conventional targets, insurgents and terrorists. The most
prominent “combat experience” the Super Hornet has is against an enemy
who buried
their air force under sand dunes.
The Super Hornet cannot be regarded to be “multirole” in the classical
sense of the term, as it lacks the performance to be credible in air
superiority and air defence roles, and it lacks the survivability to be
credible in strike roles against well defended targets.
Australia's provable strategic needs “in the next 8-10 years” cannot be
met by the Super Hornet, “Classic” Hornet or any other low performance
aircraft in this class. All are performance constrained to being
sub-sonic machines with low supersonic dash capabilities when combat
loaded. The JSF will be in this very same class – its design
specifications and the ubiquitous Cost As an Independent Variable
(CAIV) have made it so.
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The Super Hornet is the clear choice as a bridging air
combat capability for three reasons:
- First because of its excellent
capability to meet Australia’s requirements;
- Second because of its availability
and supportability; and
- Third because Air Force has the
capacity to make this transition more easily than with any other
aircraft.
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- First the Super Hornet cannot meet
Australia's developing strategic needs due to its poor
aerodynamic and stealth performance;
- Second other fighter types
including the F-22A
Raptor could be acquired in the timeframe of interest but the
Government and Defence have yet to formally
ask; supportability of the Super Hornet will present issues since
it shares little commonality with the RAAF's 'Classic' Hornets;
- Third the transition effort, given
the different airframe and systems of the Super Hornet compared to the
'Classic' Hornet, will be as much if not more than a new aircraft type
(e.g. F-22A Raptor) with considerably greater risk of maintenance,
configuration control and logistical errors and mistakes; and
- Fourth to overcome the latter, the
Defence bureaucrats’ solution is to ‘de-risk the program’ by handing
all these activities plus engineering control of sovereign assets into
the hands of non-Australians in overseas companies. The reason
for this ‘de-risking’ is a lack of confidence in our own abilities – “the great Australian cultural cringe”
– which, in turn, will lead to loss of jobs and the further
‘de-skilling’ of Defence, itself, and, more significantly, Australian
Industry.
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The
Super Hornet is in service with the United States Navy through to
2030 and will continue to be upgraded, keeping it relevant through
until 2020. |
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US strategists are already deeply concerned about the viability of the
Super
Hornet in the 'Sukhoi-rich' Asia-Pacific region over the coming decade.
Its limitations cannot be fixed by upgrades as they are inherent in the
shaping and airframe design of the aircraft.
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It
will ensure our air combat capability edge is maintained through the
transition to F-35 over the next decade. |
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The aerodynamic and stealth performance limitations of both the Super
Hornet and the F-35 will deny an ‘air combat capability edge’ should
either of these types enter RAAF service.
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The
Block II Super Hornet will be on the ground in Australia in a
little over two years. |
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Whether the aircraft is delivered or not in this timeframe, full
operational capability will not be achieved in anything
approaching that timeframe.
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The
Super Hornet acquisition will allow us to retire the F-111 at a
time of our choosing. |
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The Defence bureaucracy decided to prematurely retire the F-111 in
2003, with an intended retirement date of 2010. The ‘time of our
choosing’ was a flawed decision taken four years ago by those in the
ranks of the senior Defence bureaucrats and ministerial advisers
in Canberra, then
entrusted to guard the
nation’s air combat capability edge, an edge that had been protected
and honed since the end of
the Korean War. The repercussions of that ‘imposed’ edict is
now readily apparent for those who have the capacity to put bias to one
side
and view the issues dispassionately and objectively.
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Regarding
claims the Super Hornet is not sufficiently stealthy
The Super Hornet is a low-observable (LO) aircraft, orders of magnitude
more 'stealthy' than F-111 or Su-30s.
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This claim ignores the reality that the Super Hornet must carry
external fuel tanks and weapons to be useful in combat. The radar
signature of these external stores largely nullifies any signature
reduction achieved in the Super Hornet by the use of the trapezoidal
inlets, sculpted inlet tunnels, and radar bay shroud.
The Russian
Irbis E radar carried by late model Flankers will detect a 1 square
metre target at 160 NMI (~300 km), yet the centimetric band radar
signature of
even a single external store such as a missile rail or fuel tank is of
that order of magnitude.
The claim that the Super Hornet is “orders of magnitude more ‘stealthy’
than F-111 or Su-30s.” suggests the Super Hornet has a radar cross
section of the order of 0.1 square metres or better, a courageous claim
given the shaping design limitations of the Super Hornet.
Source: Iris Independent
Research
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The
F-35 JSF is a Very Low Observable (VLO) aircraft and true 5th
generation. |
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The non exportable US
only F-35 JSF variant may be able to achieve true Very Low Observable
(VLO) performance only
in a narrow sector around its nose, but the aircraft cannot be termed
low observable in the tail and beam sectors by any stretch of the
imagination. Therefore the JSF is at best a Low-Observable (LO)
aircraft with single sector Very Low Observable (VLO) performance.
Export models are expected to have inferior stealth performance
compared to the non exportable US only F-35 JSF variants.
A ‘true 5th generation’ fighter will incorporate supersonic
cruise, high agility, all aspect stealth and integrated avionics.
The JSF has only one of these attributes (integrated avionics) and part
of another (all aspect stealth), therefore it cannot be a ‘true 5th
generation’ fighter like the F-22A Raptor or the Russian PAK-FA
(T-50) when it comes into service circa 2015.
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Regarding Super Hornet not being 5th generation
The ADF has never said that the Super Hornet is '5th generation' - a
term referring to the combination of stealth and sensor integration.
The only two true 5th generation aircraft are F-22
Raptor and the F-35 JSF.
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No, but Boeing St Louis does make the claim that “the Super Hornet
really is a fifth generation air plane” in their promotional video, an
extract of which was shown on the 4 Corners Program.
It remains to be determined exactly where the Minister found the
information upon which he made his “no brainer decision”, and exactly
where senior Defence officials found their information on the Super
Hornet aircraft.
The F-35 JSF cannot be a ‘true 5th generation’ fighter as it will never
have supersonic cruise, high agility, and all aspect stealth
capabilities.
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Super
Hornet vs Su-30 series aircraft
If a Super
Hornet was to meet a Su-30 in the coming 8 years, ADF pilots would want
to be in the F-18F cockpit every time. Any pilot who has flown the new
Block II F-18F with AESA radar would feel the same way. |
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Success in combat is determined by advantages in capability, numbers
and the ability to exploit these advantages operationally. The feelings
of pilots have much less impact, as proven repeatedly in air wars since
1914.
Sir Robert
Brooke-Popham observed in 1942, days before many brave young RAAF
pilots were killed in combat with superior Japanese A6M2 Zeroes, that “[Brewster] Buffaloes are quite
enough for Malaya”,
and that the A6M2 Zero was “on a par with
our Buffalo ...”.
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The
Super Hornet is a true multi-role aircraft that spans the air
combat spectrum, including maritime strike, which is so vital for
Australia. |
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The performance limitations of the Super Hornet render the first claim
erroneous.
While the Super Hornet has the capability to carry maritime strike
weapons like the subsonic Harpoon, its range performance is inadequate
for this role without significant aerial refuelling support, unlike the
F-111.
Su-30 variants arriving in the region are much superior in the maritime
role, with better range/payload performance than the Super Hornet, and
the ability to carry far more potent anti-shipping missiles like the
supersonic Yakhont
and Moskit
(Sunburn).
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The
Block II airframe is redesigned for signature reduction and the
aircraft is built around the most advanced radar in any non-fifth
generation aircraft in the world. |
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While the Super Hornet airframe does have some signature reduction
measures, as noted previously, the signature of external weapons and
fuel tanks will be enough to render the aircraft highly vulnerable to
long range engagement using advanced Russian radars and missiles.
While the APG-79 radar in the Block II Super Hornet does use
newer transmitter and packaging technology than the Russian Irbis E
radar in the Su-35BM/Su-35-1
[NB zipped 20 MB PDF],
it still uses similar receiver and
processor technology.
More importantly, it has only one half the antenna size and less peak
power compared to the Russian radar. As a result the Russian Irbis E
radar will outrange the APG-79 in the Block II Super Hornet.
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Modern lethal weapons render any aircraft performance
measure
irrelevant if it does not enable first shot. First shot is achieved
long range through:
- modern networking;
- survivability
– (through signature reduction and integrated electronic
counter-measures that deny opponents the ability to shoot);
- advanced radars to cue weapons early; and
- lethal missiles – (with long range and protection
against countermeasures).
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In most realistic scenarios, the late model Sukhoi Flanker will achieve
a long range first shot capability against the Super Hornet, through:
Moreover, aircraft aerodynamic performance
measures are not irrelevant if these allow a fighter to rapidly escape
from an opponent's missile engagement envelope. The poor supersonic
performance of the Super Hornet denies it such opportunities.
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In
its air superiority roles, the F/A-18F possesses all these attributes
and will test any modern air defence system. |
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The late variants of the Sukhoi Flanker also possess all these
attributes, but are also much more agile and much faster than the Super
Hornet, giving the advantage in combat to the Sukhoi.
Moreover, these attributes will have little bearing on the ability of
the Super Hornet to survive in “any modern air defence system”, where
the regional benchmark are the S-300PMU-2/S-400
and S-300VM long range
Surface to Air Missile systems. US strategists regard only the F-22A
Raptor and B-2A
Spirit to be capable of surviving encounters with these
Russian air defence weapons.
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Air combat capability is about far more than the
aircraft
specifications. Reliable, sustainable logistics support, the best
training and a full air combat system of command and control is
required to match modern threats.
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More importantly, and unfortunately, turnkey support provided by
Russian contractors,
including aircrew and groundcrew, allow regional Flanker operators to
also achieve “reliable, sustainable logistics support, the best
training and a full air combat system of command and control”.
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No
other aircraft can meet this requirement in the bridging timeframe
better than F-18F Super Hornet. |
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Australia's strategic needs could be met far better in this timeframe
by the F-22A Raptor.
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Was
DSTO’s F-111 wing testing flawed?
There were
no errors in the set-up of DSTO’s F-111C wing fatigue test. The wing
fatigue test was developed to simulate the loads on the aircraft
in-flight. |
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There were a number of significant errors in the set-up of DSTO’s
F-111C wing fatigue test. Primarily, these were due to the
re-direction, to other non-F-111 related projects, of the funds that
had been appropriated by Government in 1998 to the F-111 Sole Operator
Programme, as recommended by the RAAF F-111 Support Study of 1996. The
resulting significant shortfall in funding led to serious shortcomings
in the test set up as well as the testing itself including, inter alia, inadequate pre-test
inspection of the test wing; inadequate instrumentation for monitoring
the whole of the wing during testing; a test rig that introduced
non-representative loads into the wing; and, insufficient resources to
adequately monitor and analyse the whole wing structure during testing
to ensure any defects that developed during testing were detected as
early as possible.
Basically, the DSTO had barely sufficient funding to focus on the inner
wing area (the wing root, including the Wing Pivot Fitting) let alone
the whole of the wing, including the outer wing panels where the “surprise, catastrophic failure” was
to occur.
A simple comparison between this test programme and the approach,
methodologies and test techniques used on the F-A-18 International
Follow-On Structural Test (IFOST) Programme done with the Canadians
highlights the deficiencies that led to the “surprise, catastrophic failure”
experienced on the first wing test article in the DSTO F-111C Wing
Fatigue Test Programme.
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The
F-111C wing fatigue test was initiated by Air Force and conducted
by DSTO to manage and address fatigue cracking problems identified in
the mid-1990s. |
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The F-111C wing fatigue test was initiated by the engineering experts
in Air Force and conducted by the experts in the DSTO who were,
unfortunately, subsequently underfunded for doing the work by the
non-experts in Air Force – those whom the Chief of the Air Force and
Chief Defence Scientist referred to in evidence to the Parliamentary
Committee inquiring into air superiority as those who “don’t know what
they don’t know”.
Claiming “to manage and address
fatigue cracking problems identified in the mid-1990s” amounts
to spin, and is indicative of the level of deskilling that has occurred
in Defence, as much as the dominance in the belief of ‘form over
substance’ at the senior levels in both Defence and Government.
Such testing is standard practice in the engineering management of high
performance machines like the F-111. Those who did the F-111
Support Study understood this fact back in 1996, as the extract
below from the September 1996 Addendum to that study
acknowledges. This testing was meant to be routine and part of
the overall risk management efforts which, if done properly, would see
the aircraft remaining operational out to 2020 and, if necessary,
beyond.
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The
Wing Fatigue test article failed unexpectedly
during testing.
All F-111C wings were subsequently replaced with later model wings
which passed the wing fatigue test.
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To have a Wing Fatigue test article fail “unexpectedly” during testing was
unheard of in the recent annals of aircraft life extension fatigue
testing,
until this “surprise, catastrophic
failure”. To have such a failure in such testing shows
this first test was non-representative, and thus flawed.
Such testing is all about loading the full scale test article – in this
case an F-111C wing – with representative flight loads and then,
through monitoring and regular inspections, detecting any defect that
may develop and doing so as early as possible.
The process, as was
applied on the IFOST and on all other such testing known to APA, is
then to analyse the defect, develop an ‘in the field’ inspection and
repair which are then sent to the fleet to be applied in the normal
course of maintenance of the aircraft. In the meantime, the test
article is repaired and testing continued until, at such time when the
aims of the testing have been achieved or this overall process reaches
the limit of economic sustainability (whichever comes first), no
further repairs are done and the test article is allowed (and
predictably so) to catastrophically fail.
The test article is then full inspected and analysed.
The first test wing was an ex-RAAF wing that had seen 5,418 hours in
service. The defect that led to this “surprise catastrophic
failure’ of the first test wing was there on day one of the test and
remained undetected throughout the following 8,089 hours of
testing. Over that time, it developed and grew, undetected, into
a crack of the critical size necessary for failure of the
structure. There were other defects in this wing that similarly
developed and grew, undetected, over the 8,089 hours of testing but had
not reached critical size before this “surprise,
catastrophic failure”.
As a result of this
“surprise, catastrophic failure”,
the engineering experts in the RAAF, the DSTO and, importantly,
Industry worked
collegiately and devised automated ‘safety by inspection’
procedures and processes, repair techniques, and an F-111 Wing
Re-furbishment/Repair Line at RAAF Base Amberley through which the
F-111 wings,
both the original wing sets purchased as spares well before the “surprise, catastrophic failure” and
those ‘F’ and ‘D’ Model additional wing sets purchased
following the test failure, have been processed.
To say “All F-111C wings were subsequently replaced with later model
wings which passed the wing fatigue test” is simply untrue and reflects
an incorrect understanding of what has actually been achieved. In fact,
the
F-111s were returned to service with ‘F’ and ‘D’ Model
wings, all of which have now been inspected for defects in the the
areas of
interest, including those found to have gone undetected during the
first failed
test.
When the APA Team last checked, following the retirement out of service
of the
last F-111G aircraft, no cracks had been found in any of the areas on
the wing
where cracks had been allowed to develop and grow either during the
first
failed test or the recent successfully progressing second wing fatigue
test,
prior to that test being shut down. All F-111C aircraft were flying
with the
later, better production quality ‘F’ and ‘D’ Model
wings processed through the F-111 Wing Re-furbishment/Repair Line.
However,
since it is so easy to change the wings on the F-111 and the RAAF now
have so
many spare wings, this may not be the case today, assuming the RAAF are
mitigating risk by processing the F-111 wings through the Wing
Re-furbishment/Repair Line.
As for “...later model wings which
passed the wing fatigue test”, this statement is, simply,
nonsense.
There has been one additional wing fatigue test by the DSTO on a single
wing. This test had surpassed the predicted life of the previous
failed wing test – “….the total
equivalent flight hours at failure was set at 18,918 hours” – by
a significant degree and was exceeding expectations when, following the
Minister’s announcement that he was buying Super Hornets because the
decision “was a no brainer” and “we are hornet country”, the test
program was shut down.
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Defence
evaluation of various capability options:
It is a normal part of prudent military planning to develop fallback
options for Government consideration. |
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At face value, this statement could almost be true though, when
assessed against the norms of complex project management standards and
standard risk management let alone the requirements of the Financial
Management and Administration Act (FMA Act), the Commonwealth
Procurement Guidelines (CPG), the Defence Procurement Policy Manual
(DPPM), and the Defence Capability Life Cycle Management
Guide (DCLCMG) that were applicable at the time of the JSF
decision, the term “a normal part of prudent military planning” should
be changed to “an essential and mandatory part….”.
One would be hard pressed to say that the often used term of “...keeping a watching brief on other
capabilities” satisfies the criteria of “a normal part…” let alone “an essential and mandatory part of prudent
military planning”.
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The bridging capability option leveraged off several
years of on-going analysis through Air 6000.
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The data and the facts on the public record show that if any such
analysis were done, which might support the decision for Australia to
acquire the Super Hornet, then it was and still is, at best, less than
objective, if not very seriously flawed.
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Preliminary DSTO studies were carried out on both the
technical risk
and operational analysis of Block II Super Hornet as a bridging air
combat capability prior to Government decision.
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The data and the facts, given the documented history of events, when
considered against the statements made by Defence prior to the
announcement of the Government decision, and when compared with the
public assertions of the Minister for Defence, the Hon Dr Brendan
Nelson, in announcing his decision, do not support this claim.
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The
F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet is clearly the most capable aircraft
across all air combat roles that Air Force have the capacity to
introduce in the bridging timeframe. |
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That Air Force capacity should be a principal determinant for a less
than capable aircraft to be acquired to fill Australia’s air combat
needs is not supported by historical fact or the experiences of those
who have been involved in the introduction of completely new types of
aircraft into Australian service, either in the military or civil
sectors of Australian aviation. Even a cursory look at the
introduction of the C-130, Mirage, F-4E, F-111 and F/A-18A/B into
Australian service shows this statement to be non-sequitur.
The question remains whether any professional with first hand
experience in the introduction, at the level of engineering and
logistical responsibility, of a new complex aircraft type (military or
civilian) into service
in Australia had any accountable input into the planning and any advice
that led to this decision by the Minister.
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The
option of the F/A-18F Super Hornet builds on our understanding of
the current F/A-18 fleet. This option is least risk to ensure that
Australia’s capability edge is maintained at a time of major equipment
renewal and change for Air Force |
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Given the unique airframe design, largely different avionics and very
different engines in the Super Hornet, compared to Australia's legacy
Hornet fleet, very little 'understanding of
the current F/A-18 fleet' will be useful in operating the Super Hornet.
Introduction of the Super Hornet will introduce significant strategic
risk as regional Sukhoi operators will appreciate its well known
capability limitations.
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F-111
The F-111 is a great strike aircraft, professionally operated and
maintained by RAAF personnel. |
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APA concurs with the statement that the “F-111 is a great strike
aircraft, professionally operated”. However, the Deeper Level
Maintenance of the F-111 fleet is provided by members of the Australian
Defence Aerospace Industry employed by or under contract with Boeing
Australia Ltd or directly with Defence.
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The
F-111 has been the stalwart of Australia's air strike power for
last 30 years but will not continue to meet Australia's strategic needs. |
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Australia's emerging strategic needs now include:
- Long range strike against land targets
- Long range maritime strike
- Cruise missile defence
- Long range interception of bomber and maritime
aircraft
- Persistent strike against battlefield targets.
- Precision strike against deeply buried targets.
- Full spectrum persistent electronic attack.
In all of these roles an F-111 with suitable technology insertion
upgrades outperforms the Super Hornet decisively, and does so at a
fraction of the cost, with much less or no demand for aerial refuelling
support.
Moreover, neither the Super Hornet nor the JSF can lift deep bunker
busting weapons such as the 5,000 lb class EGBU/GBU-28/B, as both
aircraft are too small, whereas the F-111 is already cleared for these
critically important weapons.
In the vital full spectrum electronic attack role, an EF-111A equipped
with the ALQ-99 ICAP III suite is both more survivable, longer ranging
and more persistent than any other alternative.
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Australia aims to retire the F-111 at a time of our
choosing, noting
the F-111 was planned to retire well before Super Hornet was considered
as a bridging capability.
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The Boeing St Louis plan to sell Super Hornets to Australia (Project
ARCHANGEL) has been in play since 1998. In 2003, Defence was
directed by the then Minister for Defence, the Hon Senator Robert Hill,
to effectively ‘cease and desist’ from considering an interim fighter
solution.
In 2004, the Chief of the Air Force (CAF) stated that the F-111 would
not be retired until all major capability projects supporting the RAAF
Air Combat Capability were completed and in service. These projects
included the AEW&C aircraft, the New Air Refuel Tankers, the Hornet
Upgrade (HUG) Program, and the Weapons Improvement Programs.
On page 147 of the Defence Annual Report (DAR) published at the end of
calendar year 2004, the following statement may be found:
“The decision to retire
the F111 aircraft around 2010 was announced during the year. To ensure
the maintenance of strike capability, the Government announced that
retirement of the F111 was dependent on the successful introduction
into service of airborne early warning and control and A330 tanker
aircraft, completion of the F/A18 upgrade, and the introduction of
improved weapons and long-range stand-off weapons for P3 Orion and
F/A18 Hornet aircraft.”
In 2005 and 2006, the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), the new CAF, the
Deputy Chief of the Air Force (DCAF), the NACC Program Office and the
Office of the Minister for Defence repeated this statement though
without any reference to arming the P-3 Orion with long range stand-off
weapons notable by its absence.
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The
F-111 would operate at increasing operational risk with emerging
threats in the coming decade beyond 2010. It would also operate at
increasing safety risk beyond 2010 with the ageing airframe issues
highlighted by wing fatigue, well publicized fuel tank issues and
wiring looms. |
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The operational risk incurred by an F-111 armed with planned cruise
missiles such as the AGM-158 JASSM is very low due to the 150 nautical
mile standoff range of this missile, and even greater range of the
proposed JASSM-ER when carried.
In engagement scenarios involving Surface to Air Missile systems, the
higher speed and much lower penetration altitude of the F-111 compared
to the Super Hornet results in far fewer firing opportunities for a
defending Surface to Air Missile system, especially if a stand-off
weapon is carried by the F-111.
In engagement scenarios involving hostile fighter aircraft, the much
higher speed and persistence of the F-111 compared to the Super Hornet
result in fewer firing opportunities for hostile fighters. A Sukhoi
Flanker cannot run down an F-111 in a tailchase engagement, but it can
easily run down a Super Hornet (or JSF).
The supposed “ageing aircraft issues
highlighted by wing fatigue” have already been addressed.
However, the dominant
factor in the ‘age’ of an aircraft and ‘Aging Aircraft Programs’ is
flying hours and related cycles of operation – not calendar
years. Unlike humans and other ‘biological beings’ from which
people generally derive an understanding of ‘age’ and ‘aging’, properly
maintained aircraft do not ‘age’ or develop ‘ageing aircraft issues’
when they are not flying. After all, they are machines and are
not made of living tissue that ‘ages’ with the passage of time.
As for the “well publicized fuel tank
issues and wiring looms”, this event and the near loss of F-111
A8-112 and crew was a result of sound engineering advice being ignored
by ‘those who don’t know what they
don’t know’ about aviation, in particular the F-111, within
Defence.
In 1999, the fuel tank wiring was identified as one of the high
technical risks on the F-111 fleet by the incoming Deeper Level
Maintenance contractor and members of the Test and Evaluation (T&E)
community in Australia experienced with the F-111. Various
attempts were made in the intervening years by experts in both the RAAF
and Industry to encourage Defence management to fund what was,
ostensibly, an extremely cost effective, low risk replacement program
with later technology fuel tank wiring looms. This contemporary
wiring loom technology had been specifically developed on the back of
lessons learned from fuel tank explosions in other aircraft.
Defence management paid no heed to the advice of these experts.
In 2002, as the statement suggests, the wiring loom induced fuel tank
explosion in A8-112 near Darwin became the “well publicized fuel tank issues and
wiring looms” safety risk.
Footnote:
Defence management has only recently approved funding for replacing the
F-111 fuel tank wiring as first recommended back in 1999, having
finally accepted expert advice that the inspection program implemented
post the explosion in the A8-112 F-1 fuel tank was fundamentally
flawed. These time consuming and quite expensive inspections
could only infer that there were no defects in the wiring looms.
They could not ensure and assure there were none that could develop
into a source for ignition, leading to another fuel tank explosion.
Problems in wiring looms that led to fuel tank explosions in other
aircraft (a.k.a. above ‘lessons learned’ that led to development of the
later fuel tank wiring technology) included well known issues with
Kapton ® insulated wiring. Wiring with this problem insulation
has been fully replaced on the F-111. However, the electrical
looms in Australia’s F/A-18 Hornets are made up of wires with
insulation of this problem type.
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The F-111's effective range is increasingly reduced as
it needs to
avoid air and surface threats rather than having the ability to
penetrate them as can a modern multi-role fighter such as the F-18F
Block II Super Hornet.
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2
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The Super Hornet cannot credibly penetrate integrated air defences
equipped with late variants of the Sukhoi Flanker and
S-300PMU-2/S-400/S-300VM air defence missile systems; in the US force
structure this role is reserved for the F-22A Raptor and B-2A Spirit as
only these types are regarded to be sufficiently survivable.
The Super Hornet will have no choice than to employ “avoidance tactics”
not unlike the F-111, but the lower speed, lower persistence and higher
operating altitude of the Super Hornet will force far more cautious
tactics than feasible with the F-111.
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The
F-111 needs a fighter escort with any air threat, is not networked
and doesn't fit into Australia's networked Defence architecture for the
coming decade. |
3
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1
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The F-111 remains survivable against a wide range of air threats,
especially those lacking the performance to easily gain missile firing
opportunities. Escort is only required against air threats with high
speed, high persistence and high power aperture radar systems, and only
when the F-111 is not carrying a cruise missile warload.
Last year engineers at the RAAF Amberley depot performed prototype
integration of a state of the art MIDS LVT network terminal into the
F-111 avionic system, and did so on a small internal development
budget. The absence of network terminals in the F-111 is because
the Defence bureaucracy refused to fund this low cost enhancement to
capability.
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The
decision to join the JSF Program
Australia
joined the JSF Program in October 2002 to obtain access to F-35 Air
System information, as well as capability and industry outcomes,
recognising that gaining these benefits did not commit Australia to
acquire the JSF aircraft. |
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1
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The decision to join the JSF Program was announced in June 2002.
In early 2001, while acting Secretary of Defence, the Undersecretary
of Defence Materiel (USDM), had a meeting at the request and with
the Head of the DMO Aerospace System Division (HASD) and his senior
staff. At this meeting, the USDM expressed his belief that, inter
alia, Defence should ‘go straight for the JSF’ to replace the Hornets
and the F-111s as soon as possible.
Over the intervening 14 months, the USDM and a select group of senior
DMO staff travelled widely; lobbied the Offices of the Ministers for
Defence and Industry; and, ‘recruited’ selected individuals in Defence,
other government departments and Industry to the cause of convincing
others in the Departments of Defence and Industry as well as other key
government departments (e.g. Finance, Treasury and PM&C) that the
Government should ‘decide’ to join the JSF Program.
Clearly, the Capability Staff and the DSTO had no knowledge of these
activities nor the USDM’s intentions since they issued solicitations to
Industry (e.g. AIR6000 Force Mix Option Market Survey etc) in the
latter part of 2001.
If these solicitations had been issued with knowledge of the USDM’s
intentions, then those authorizing the issue of such solicitations
would, inter alia, have been in breach of Commonwealth Procurement
Guidelines (CPG) and its overarching legislations, namely, the
Financial Management and Administration Act (FMA Act).
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The
decision also recognised the clear benefits that a stealthy,
multi-role, 5th generation JSF offered over the full range of contender
aircraft based on Defence analysis undertaken on contenders to replace
the air combat capability provided by the F-111 and F/A-18 aircraft. |
3
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1
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The JSF is, at best, a 5th generation aircraft by marketing literature
only. The multi-role and stealthy capabilities of the JSF have yet to
be demonstrated and, rightly, are regarded by most experts as somewhat
problematic at this stage.
The aviation adage of ‘fly before you buy’ has its origins in the
common sense standard of caveat
emptor. Would any of you reading this “On the Record”
statement purchase or commit to purchase an car without at least test
driving it?
At the time of the decision to join the SDD Phase of the JSF Program,
the analysis and evaluation phases of the AIR6000 Project had not yet
been funded, let alone started. Funding approval for this work
under Stage III of Phase 1 of the then AIR6000 Project - the Analysis and Evaluation Stage - was
to be sought in September 2001.
As to what has since then, has any evidence in the form of hard data
and facts or formal reports emerged to support the notion that any
rigorous and objective analysis of the type required by the Defence
Capability Development System that existed at the time of ‘the
decision’ has been done on “the full range of contender aircraft …. to
replace the air combat capability provided by the F-111 and F/A-18
aircraft”?
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For a minimal outlay of only around 0.3% of the JSF’s
development budget, benefits from joining the Program included:
- The opportunity to participate in a developmental
program largely funded by the US Government;
- Privileged access to JSF Program information;
- The opportunity for very detailed technical risk
analysis by Defence of
all JSF systems years before any contractual commitment;
- Constant engagement with the JSF Program Office on
JSF cost analysis.
Unprecedented ability for early development of our concept of
operations and tactics;
- Enhanced opportunities for interoperability and
commonality to support future coalition operations;
- Delivery of the required air combat capability ahead
of non-Partner customers.
The unprecedented opportunity for Australia to participate in, and
influence, the design and capability of an advanced fighter aircraft;
- The opportunity to take part in the JSF test program
(the most comprehensive flight test program ever);
- Australia
is already involved in defining what will be included in the first
upgrades to the aircraft after the current development phase is
complete; and
- The opportunity for Australian industry to be part of
the global supply chain of the world’s largest defence project.
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1
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1
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The language used in this statement typifies the flowery marketing
language that has been the hallmark of the AIR6000, now New Air Combat
Capability (NACC) Project, since the announcement of the Government
‘decision’ to join the JSF Program.
However, APA has never criticised this ‘decision’ for the reasons that
were given at the time; namely, for Defence to become a smarter
customer to enable better risk management and informed decision making
while providing Australian Industry access to the world’s largest
defence project. The aircraft's unsuitability for Australia's strategic
environment is an issue in its own right.
APA and many of its colleagues in Defence and Industry see great risks
in the JSF Program which, if appropriately managed collectively, could
be turned into greater opportunities for Australian Industry, Defence
and the JSF Program itself.
Given the multi talented, integrated skills base; expertise in
innovative thinking; and, particular assets able to Test and
Evaluation, that are resident, if not uniquely, in our Nation,
Australians could be helping their American counterparts retire risks
on the JSF Program. This would be complementary to and further
expand opportunities in the already hard won, less developmentally
risky though very important manufacturing and process design work
already being done by members of Australian Industry.
What APA and its colleagues in Industry and Defence are disappointed
with is the lack of foresight, paucity of appropriate risk management
and proper due diligence, and unwillingness to engage in open, critical
debate on the part of the New Air Combat Capability Project Office and
Defence as a whole, while actively trying to suppress independent
thought as well as innovative and countervailing views in Defence and
Industry. These forms of behaviour and their underlying attitude
are a recipe for disaster.
“Fly before you buy”, as the Dutch and British plan to do, should be
the fundamental tenet of the NACC
Project with well considered and developed contingency strategies and
risk treatment plans in place in relation to the capability, cost,
schedule, project risk and Industry issues associated with the project.
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EF |
NS |
SP |
|
Score |
Scoring Totals:
|
Error of Fact - Instances found:
|
42
|
|
|
Non Sequitur - Instances found: |
|
17
|
|
Spin
- Instances found: |
|
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32
|
Totals:
|
42
|
17
|
32
|